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The appearance of novel pathogens of humans with epidemic potential and high mortality rates have
threatened global health security for centuries. Over the past few decades new zoonotic infectious
diseases of humans caused by pathogens arising from animal reservoirs have included West Nile virus,
Yellow fever virus, Ebola virus, Nipah virus, Lassa Fever virus, Hanta virus, Dengue fever virus, Rift Valley
fever virus, Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic fever virus, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus,
highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses, Middle East Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus, and Zika
virus. The recent Ebola Virus Disease epidemic in West Africa and the ongoing Zika Virus outbreak in
South America highlight the urgent need for local, regional and international public health systems to be
be more coordinated and better prepared. The One Health concept focuses on the relationship and
interconnectedness between Humans, Animals and the Environment, and recognizes that the health and
wellbeing of humans is intimately connected to the health of animals and their environment (and vice
versa). Critical to the establishment of a One Health platform is the creation of a multidisciplinary team
with a range of expertise including public health officers, physicians, veterinarians, animal husbandry
specialists, agriculturalists, ecologists, vector biologists, viral phylogeneticists, and researchers to co-
operate, collaborate to learn more about zoonotic spread between animals, humans and the
environment and to monitor, respond to and prevent major outbreaks. We discuss the unique
opportunities for Middle Eastern and African stakeholders to take leadership in building equitable and
effective partnerships with all stakeholders involved in human and health systems to take forward a ‘One
Health’ approach to control such zoonotic pathogens with epidemic potential.
 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International Society for Infectious Diseases.
This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-
nc-nd/4.0/).
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jou r nal h o mep ag e: w ww .e lsev ier . co m / loc ate / i j id1. Introduction
The appearance, disappearance, and re-emergence of novel
pathogens of humans with both epidemic potential and high
mortality rates have threatened global health security for
centuries.1 Over the past few decades, notable new zoonotic
infectious diseases of humans have been caused by pathogens
arising from animal reservoirs, including West Nile virus, yellow
fever virus, Ebola virus, Nipah virus, Lassa fever virus, hantavirus,
dengue virus, Rift Valley fever virus, Crimean-Congo haemorrhagic
fever virus, severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS-
CoV), highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses, Middle East
respiratory syndrome coronavirus (MERS-CoV), and Zika virus
(ZKV).2 The recent Ebola virus disease (EVD) epidemic in West
Africa3 and the ongoing ZKV outbreak in South America4 highlight
the urgent need for local, regional, and international public health
systems to be better prepared.5–8
The unique opportunities for Middle Eastern and African
stakeholders to take leadership in building equitable and effective
partnerships with all stakeholders involved in human and health
systems, to take forward a ‘One Health’ approach to control such
zoonotic pathogens with epidemic potential, is highlighted here. Inhttp://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ijid.2016.06.012
1201-9712/ 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd on behalf of International So
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).this article the example of MERS-CoV is used as an important case
in point.
2. Need for newer approaches to control zoonotic diseases
The 2014–2015 EVD epidemic in West Africa showed that
countries with weak health services and inadequate capacity to
identify infectious disease outbreaks early are unable to respond
appropriately to control the outbreak. International health agencies
were too sluggish to effect an early resolution. There were no rapid
point-of-care diagnostics, no specific treatments, no vaccines, and
insufficient medical care facilities, teams, and trained staff, and
furthermore the international responses were initially uncoordi-
nated and unable to adapt policies and advice for a very different
expression of the disease. As a consequence, aggressive community
responses to inappropriate health interventions, foreign aid work-
ers, and researchers unfamiliar with local cultural and health
systems norms were common and life-threatening.9,10 Research to
find and evaluate new treatments and vaccines conducted during
the EVD epidemic was also slow to start and was dominated by
foreign groups with little involvement of local scientists.7,9 The
development and evaluation of experimental tools came too late tociety for Infectious Diseases. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
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workers and researchers were not familiar with local cultural and
medical services norms and aroused local anxieties.10
The EVD epidemic highlighted the need for developing more
comprehensive local, national, international, and global surveil-
lance, as well as epidemic and outbreak preparedness response
infrastructures. Multiple animal, human, and environmental factors
are obviously playing a critical role in the evolution, transmission,
and pathogenesis of zoonotic pathogens, and these require urgent
definition to enable appropriate interventions to be developed for
optimal surveillance, detection, management, laboratory analysis,
prevention, and control in both human and animal populations.
An important need exists for establishing long-term, sustain-
able, trusting and meaningful and equitable collaborations
between the animal, human, ecosystem, and environmental health
sectors at the local, national, and international levels. These should
include sustainable political and funder support for developing
human and laboratory capacity and training that enables effective
human–animal health cooperation leading to proactive surveil-
lance, early detection of potential pandemic pathogens, and rapid
initiation of public health prevention and control guidelines and
interventions. Whilst a long list of pathogens with epidemic
potential are on the radar of the World Health Organization
(WHO),2 ideally ‘prevention is better than cure’ and new pathogens
should be dealt with at the animal source, tackling the drivers and
triggers of pathogen evolution and emergence. This requires close
cooperation between human and animal health systems and an
appreciation of human impacts on the environment at all levels
and easy access to adequate laboratory facilities.
3. WHO priority list of the top 10 emerging pathogens
On December 10, 2015 an expert panel convened by WHO
prioritized a list of emerging pathogens ‘‘considered likely to cause
severe outbreaks in the near future, and for which no, or insufficient,
preventive and curative solutions exist’’.11,12 The list of the top
10 includes the new viral zoonotic pathogen of humans MERS-
CoV,13,14 which was first isolated from a patient who died of a
severe respiratory illness in a hospital in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia in
June 2012.15
The emergence of MERS-CoV in 201215 was the second time
(after SARS-CoV16) that a highly pathogenic coronavirus of humans
emerged in the 21st century.17 A strong link between human cases
of MERS-CoV and dromedary camels has been established through
several studies.18–26 MERS-CoV is endemic in the camel popula-
tions of East Africa and the Middle East21,25,26 and presents a
constant threat to human health in both regions. Retrospective
studies using stored serum from different geographical locations
have indicated that MERS-CoV has been circulating for several
decades.25 As of May 1, 2016, there have been 1733 laboratory-
confirmed cases of MERS reported to the WHO,27 with a mortality
of 34% (628 cases died). Whilst most MERS cases have been
reported from the Middle East (a large proportion from
Saudi Arabia), MERS cases have been reported from 27 countries
in all continents.27 The WHO has held nine meetings of the
Emergency Committee (EC) for MERS-CoV.28
4. The persistent and lurking epidemic threat of MERS-CoV
Since evidence of sustained human-to-human transmission of
MERS-CoV in the community is lacking, the WHO currently does
not recommend travel restrictions to the Middle East. However,
MERS-CoV remains a major global public health threat with
continuing reports of new human MERS cases in Saudi Arabia,
where millions of pilgrims from over 184 countries travel
throughout the year.29 Furthermore, a more intensive farm-basedcamel livestock system has emerged and there is a large, well-
established trade in camels between countries at the Horn of Africa
and countries in the Middle East. This has increased significantly,
particularly following the lifting of the ban on live animal imports
from Somalia by Saudi Arabia in 2009/2010. Somalia now exports
some five million live animals every year to the Gulf Arab States
(including 77 000 camels), making it the single biggest exporter of
live animals in the world. The positive experience of reviving
Somalia’s livestock export industry through increased investment
in animal disease prevention and control strategies highlights how
effective the ‘One Health’ approach can be. Most of the African
countries do not have the resources, expertise, or capacity,
including laboratory facilities, to have active surveillance for
MERS-CoV in place. In light of this, the need for increased vigilance
and watchful surveillance for MERS-CoV in Sub-Saharan Africa has
been highlighted previously.30 Such an initiative could be
supported through investments by countries that import large
numbers of camels and other livestock from the region.
The epidemic potential of MERS-CoV was recently illustrated by
a large outbreak in hospitals in Seoul, the Republic Korea, in mid-
2015: MERS-CoV was imported by a traveller to the Middle East (an
agriculture businessman), resulting in 184 MERS cases with
33 deaths.31 The first case was reported on May 20, 2015 and
over the ensuing 3 weeks, the number of secondary, tertiary, and
perhaps quaternary cases of MERS from this single patient rose
rapidly, resulting in the largest MERS case cluster occurring outside
the Middle East. The unprecedented outbreak was attributed to
poor infection control measures at the hospitals.30 Sequencing
studies of the MERS-CoV isolate showed genetic recombination of
MERS-CoV in the case exported from Korea to China.32 However,
recombination is a frequent event in MERS-CoV and the Korean
outbreak is unlikely to represent a special form of the virus.
Nonetheless, the potential evolution of MERS-CoV into a more
virulent form needs to be monitored closely.
Research on sequencing seems to have stagnated and there have
been no further sequences published from new human MERS cases
reported from the Middle East. Furthermore, the genetic evolution
of MERS-CoV strains infecting humans over the past year remains
unknown. There is an urgent need for more sequencing studies on
MERS-CoV evolution in camels and humans, with the development
of appropriate local capacity for these studies. The Kingdom of
Saudi Arabia has kept proactive watchful MERS-CoV surveillance
with regular reports to the WHO of MERS-CoV cases.33 The WHO
and ministries of health of Middle Eastern countries continue
watchful surveillance of the MERS-CoV situation, and the watchful
anticipation is that MERS-CoV may disappear with time like SARS-
CoV. However, with the continuing, regular reports of community
cases of MERS-CoV from Saudi Arabia,27 there are no signs of this
happening in the near future and lessons must be learnt from the
Korean outbreak.34 Whilst there is a growing camel livestock
industry in the region, elimination of the virus is unlikely in the
short term.
5. Urgent action required for more coordinated, collaborative
multidisciplinary MERS-CoV research
Several animal, human, and environmental factors are obviously
playing a critical role in the repeated movement of MERS-CoV from
camels to humans. The disease ecology remains largely unknown.
Urgent definition is required to enable appropriate interventions to
be developed for optimal surveillance, laboratory detection,
management, prevention, and control in both human and animal
populations. Whilst several ad hoc research studies have been
conducted and findings published over the past 4 years, more
comprehensive investments in tackling MERS-CoV have not been
forthcoming. There remain huge knowledge gaps on MERS-CoV.
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CoV infections is based on small local studies and it is difficult to
develop general country-wide policies without a clear understand-
ing of the zoonotic problem. Questions remain, for example are new
local MERS outbreaks in Saudi Arabia always seeded by the same
type of human exposure to camels? Are there particular regions of
Africa that provide infected camels to Saudi Arabia? Or is there a
general risk from all regions? Is there a way to efficiently control the
entry of infected camels? Are animal vaccination strategies
economically viable given the large number of imported animals
and the frequency of the infection?
A clear policy in which full virus genome sequences are
generated from every outbreak in the country and in which virus
from subsets of imported camels is routinely screened and
sequenced after 2 years, would provide incredibly useful informa-
tion about the transmission patterns of the virus and how to stop it.
Certainly the resources and expertise to perform this sequence
monitoring are available and only governmental support is needed
to run such a survey. The cost of such a survey would be far less than
the management costs and grief associated with a single hospital
outbreak. Numerous priority research questions regarding MERS-
CoV (basic science, epidemiology, management, and development
of new diagnostics, biomarkers, treatments, and vaccines) in both
humans and camels, highlighted 2 years ago by the WHO MERS
expert groups35 and by others,36 remain unanswered. These have
again been raised recently, highlighted by calls from Saudi Arabian
health care staff and scientists37,38 and by yet another WHO MERS
expert group, which has defined a ‘‘Roadmap for Research and
Product Development against MERS-CoV’’.39
6. Human, animal, and environmental factors
In 2000 the WHO set up the Global Outbreak Alert and Response
Network (GOARN)40 for better coordination of surveillance efforts
across the globe. It networks 150 institutions and partner agencies,
with cooperation with other agencies such as Public Health England
and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) and
consortia such as the International Severe Acute Respiratory and
Emerging Infection Consortium (ISARIC).41 Recent consortia such as
GLOPID-R aim to bring together research funding organizations on a
global scale to facilitate an effective research response within 48 h
of a significant outbreak of a new or re-emerging infectious disease
with pandemic potential.42 The past 4 years has seen outbreaks of
Ebola virus, ZKV, and MERS-CoV,2–4,13which indicate that the global
community needs to seriously reflect on what is critically missing
from current political, scientific, and public health agendas, and
how to delineate what is required at the national, regional, and
global levels to prevent future epidemics.
The factors and operating conditions that promote the
emergence and geographical spread of zoonoses are complex and
may be related to a single event or chain of multiple events
influenced by the genetic evolution of the pathogen, environmental
and climate changes, anthropological and demographic changes,
and movement and behaviour of humans, animals, and vectors.
With animal, human, and environmental factors playing a critical
role in its evolution, MERS-CoV requires more close collaboration
between human and animal health systems and university
academics to reduce the risk of pandemic spread.43 Moreover, a
better understanding of the agricultural dynamics involved in its
persistence and spread in camels and studies on interactions
between hosts in the environment are urgently needed. The
intermittent detection and reporting of MERS cases in the
community and sporadic nosocomial MERS-CoV outbreaks will
require a more coordinated response plan to study clinical cases,
conduct translational basic science and clinical trials research, and
perform longitudinal sequencing studies from human and camelMERS-CoV isolates. A more collaborative MERS-CoV response plan
is required to better define MERS-CoV epidemiology, transmission
dynamics, molecular evolution, laboratory capacity, optimal
treatment and prevention measures, and development of vaccines
for humans and camels.44 A better understanding of the prevailing
disease ecology and investigations into the dynamics of infectious
agents in wildlife could act as a better means of preventing
outbreaks in livestock and people at source.
7. The ‘One Health’ approach to tackling MERS-CoV and other
zoonotic diseases
The ‘One Health’ concept is an important concept that focuses
on the relationship and interconnections between humans,
animals, and the environment, and recognizes that the health
and wellbeing of humans is intimately linked to the health of
animals and their environment (and vice versa).45–49 A balanced
ecological approach improves understanding of the true threat of
novel pathogens and helps to avoid costly, poor, and inappropriate
responses to new diseases. In many cases, solutions can be found
through altered development pathways and are not inevitably
requiring of costly, unsustainable technical and pharmaceutical
interventions. Thus it is ideally suited to the MERS-CoV situation in
which camels, humans, and environmental factors are central to its
persistence and evolution.
Since the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is host to millions of pilgrims
each year travelling from all continents,29 tackling the threat of
MERS and other infectious diseases with epidemic potential will
require enhanced closer cooperation between those who provide
human health, animal health, and environmental health services,
locally, nationally, regionally, and internationally: the Middle
Eastern, European, African, Asian, and American governments,
veterinary groups, the WHO, the Food and Agriculture Organiza-
tion (FAO), the African Union, the United Nations International
Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), The World Bank, Office
International des Epizooties (OIE), CDC, Public Health England, the
newly formed Africa CDC, and funding agencies among others.
They should now demonstrate increased commitment towards
local, national, and global multidisciplinary collaborative efforts to
secure optimal health for people, animals, and the environment.
Global efforts need to be focused on establishing the capability for
and strengthening of surveillance systems in developing countries,
particularly in Africa where emerging and re-emerging zoonoses
are a recurrent problem. A prime emphasis should be on
developing awareness and response capacity in all countries and
on promoting interdisciplinary collaboration and coordination.
Critical to the establishment of a well-functioning ‘One Health’
platform is the creation of a multidisciplinary team with a range of
expertise, including public health officers, physicians, veterinar-
ians, animal husbandry specialists, agriculturalists, ecologists,
vector biologists, viral geneticists, and researchers, with easy
access to adequate laboratory facilities, who will collaborate in
order to learn more about zoonotic spread between animals,
humans, and the environment and to monitor, respond to, and
prevent major outbreaks.
8. Capacity building for surveillance, outbreak response, and
associated research
There is an urgent and critical need to build a sustainable public
health programme and rapid response capability for outbreaks of
zoonotic pathogens in the Middle East and in low-income countries,
especially in Africa. Importantly there is a need for capacity
development programmes designed to strengthen research training
and build career pathways for the best and brightest post-doctoral
researchers, including PhD and masters students working at the
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include national or regional laboratory facilities, as surveillance
requires laboratory support to be meaningful. The development of
human and animal health research leaders will create a critical mass
of local research capacity and the development of self-funding
research environments in African universities and research insti-
tutes. This capacity growth could be facilitated through the further
development and support of a geographical network of equitable
and enduring South–South and North–South partnerships.
9. Need for more effective political and scientific engagement
to eradicate the threat of MERS-CoV and other zoonotic diseases
The persistence of MERS-CoV 4 years since its first discovery has
created major opportunities for each of the Middle Eastern and
African countries to take leadership of the ‘One Health’ approach
with a view to bringing this under regional and global umbrellas, to
tackle new emerging and re-emerging infectious diseases with
epidemic potential. This will also devolve current dominance of the
global health agenda by Western groups and consortia and allow
equitable partnerships to be established with long-term sustain-
ability. The past year has seen some progress in research into
MERS-CoV, but there remains a need for a more effective,
coordinated, and multidisciplinary ‘One Health’ consortium to
take forward MERS-CoV research on priority areas already defined
by Saudi scientists37,38 and the WHO MERS Committee.39 The
establishment of regional ‘One Health’ Centres of excellence in the
Middle East (under the League of Arab States) and at specific
geographical locations in West, Central, East, and Southern Africa
could make an important difference in mitigating the risks and
factors that pose a risk to both human and animal health.
Furthermore, any operational plan developed will contribute to
strengthening the sentinel surveillance systems in Sub-Saharan
Africa in the preparedness and response to potential outbreaks.
Regional centres should be sufficiently empowered to manage the
spectrum of ‘One Health’ approaches to zoonotic disease control in
humans and animals, from behaviour change and social interven-
tions for prevention to surveillance of infections and antimicrobial
resistance, and preparedness and response to outbreaks.
A model for the major syndromes (respiratory, neurological,
haemorrhagic, gastro-enteric, and sepsis-like presentations)
should be developed so that clinical protocols may be adapted
rapidly for any major outbreak during mass gatherings. This should
include the development and introduction of innovative and smart
platforms for data sourcing, sample collection, and analysis, in
order to give clinicians and public health workers continuously
updated information on which clinical decisions may be based.
There is a pressing need to develop and strengthen the national
ethics and medicines regulatory frameworks in Sub-Saharan Africa
in order to strike a balance between the public health interest, the
interests of the pharmaceutical industry, and ethical values.
Parallel initiatives across Africa and the tropics could be
harmonized to create regional networks that can serve as a
repository for expert ‘One Health’ advice on agriculture, sustain-
able livestock, and the links to human development. There are
several ongoing important initiatives on developing ‘rapid
response’ and broader ‘One Health’ capacity development groups
in Europe, Asia, and the Americas to assist in the surveillance and
response to emerging infectious disease threats.
The public health systems of West African countries failed with
the Ebola epidemic, and the response from the WHO and the
international community was very slow and uncoordinated. This
led to thousands of people, including over 500 health care workers,
losing their lives. The factors governing the appearance and
disappearance of new coronaviruses affecting humans are complex
and it has been over 4 years since the first patient died of MERS-CoV.MERS cases continue to be reported throughout the year from the
Middle East. There is a large MERS-CoV camel reservoir and there is
no specific treatment or vaccine. The precise pathway from infected
camel to the recurring MERS hospital outbreaks needs to be
understood in order to devise effective control measures. With
10 million people visiting Saudi Arabia every year for Umrah and/or
Hajj and the increasing importation of live animals from Sub-
Saharan Africa, the potential risk of global spread will be ever-
present, especially if mutations or recombinations in MERS-CoV
occur. A major ‘One Health’ initiative to tackle MERS-CoV at source
in animal populations is thus required.50Middle Eastern and African
governments should now work more closely together and increase
collaborative efforts with international partners and global public
health authorities if we are to prevent yet another global zoonotic
pandemic.
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